Abstract. We apply three axioms adapted from decision theory to refinements of the Nash equilibria of games with perfect recall that select connected closed subsets called solutions. Undominated Strategies: No player uses a weakly dominated strategy in an equilibrium in a solution. Backward Induction: Each solution contains a quasi-perfect equilibrium and thus a sequential equilibrium in strategies that provide conditionally admissible optimal continuations from information sets.
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Introduction
Nash's [22, 23] definition of equilibrium is insufficient when applied to a game in extensive form. Even for games with perfect information, some equilibria use weakly dominated strategies and yield outcomes different from the outcome predicted by backward induction; see [11, §4.2] for an example. The literature on refinements aims to sharpen Nash's definition to exclude such equilibria; recent surveys include [8, 12, 31] .
Kohlberg and Mertens [14] suggest that a refinement should be characterized by axioms adapted from decision theory. They also specify properties that axioms should imply. Subsequently, Mertens [19, 20, 21] defines the set-valued refinement called stability and shows that it has these and other properties, including the following. 1. Admissibility and Perfection. All equilibria in a stable set are perfect (hence admissible) so each player's strategy in each equilibrium is undominated.
Backward Induction and Forward Induction.
A stable set includes a proper equilibrium that induces a quasi-perfect (hence sequential) equilibrium in every extensiveform game with perfect recall that has the same normal form. A subset of a stable set survives iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies and strategies that are inferior replies at every equilibrium in the set. 3. Invariance, Small Worlds and Decomposition. The stable sets of a game are the projections of the stable sets of any larger game in which it is embedded. The stable sets of the product of two independent games are the products of their stable sets.
For games in extensive form with perfect recall, we propose three axioms that are versions of these properties. We assume that for each game a refinement selects a nonempty collection of nonempty connected closed subsets of equilibria, called solutions. 2 The axioms are the following:
A. Undominated Strategies: No player uses a weakly dominated strategy in any equilibrium in a solution. 1 Mertens considers the graph of equilibria over the space of perturbed games obtained by perturbing players' strategies toward mixed strategies, and then defines a connected closed set of equilibria as stable if the projection from a neighborhood in this graph is an essential map, i.e. has nonzero degree. See Mertens [19] for further topological aspects of the definition, and Govindan and Mertens [3] for an equivalent definition in terms of players' best-reply correspondences.
2 Solutions are assumed to be sets because Kohlberg and Mertens [14, pp. 1015, 1019, 1029] show that there need not exist a single equilibrium satisfying weaker properties than the axioms invoked here. The technical requirement that a solution is connected excludes the trivial refinement that selects all equilibria. If only a single (possibly unconnected) subset is selected then only the trivial refinement satisfies the conditions invoked by Norde, Potters, Reijnierse, and Vermeulen [24] . Kreps and Wilson [16, Theorem 2] show that if payoffs are generic then all equilibria in a connected set yield the same probability distribution over terminal nodes, and thus the same paths of equilibrium play in the extensive form.
B. Backward Induction: A solution contains a quasi-perfect equilibrium. S. Small Worlds: A solution is immune to embedding the game within larger games that preserve players' strategies and payoffs.
In Axiom A we invoke only the implication of admissibility that no player uses a weakly dominated strategy. Axiom A is equivalent to admissibility in two-player games. Axiom B insists on inclusion of a quasi-perfect equilibrium because it induces a sequential equilibrium in strategies that provide admissible optimal continuations from players' information sets. 3 Axiom S ensures that a refinement is not vulnerable to framing effects depending on how the game is presented within wider contexts called metagames. A metagame can include additional players and additional pure strategies, provided these additional features do not alter optimal decisions in the original game. Our version of small worlds is stronger than Mertens' [21] version because our definition of embedding allows a more general class of metagames.
We prove that these three axioms characterize refinements that select some or all of the stable sets of a game in extensive form with perfect recall, two players, and generic payoffs. Our characterization is cast in terms of the 'enabling form' of a game in which two pure strategies of a player are considered equivalent if they exclude the same terminal nodes of the game tree, and thus enable the same sets of terminal nodes to occur as outcomes of the game. The enabling form is defined in Section 4.3 and explained further in Appendix A.
Our main theorem establishes that the axioms imply that each solution is an essential component of admissible equilibria. For the enabling form of a game this is the defining property of a stable set. 4 When payoffs are generic, all equilibria in a component yield the same probability distribution over outcomes. Therefore, for economic modeling and econometric studies the axioms' chief implication is that a predicted outcome distribution should result from an essential component of the game's admissible equilibria. A secondary implication is that a solution must include all equilibria in the component. This is germane for predicting players' behaviors only after deviations from equilibrium play, but it addresses the issue of whether sequential rationality is a relevant decision-theoretic criterion after deviations (Reny [26] ). We show that each equilibrium in a solution is induced by a quasi-perfect equilibrium in a solution of some metagame; therefore, it is sequentially rational when viewed in the wider context of this metagame. See [7, Section 2.3] for an example.
Section 2 establishes notation for Section 3, which specifies Axioms A (undominated strategies), B (backward induction), and S (small worlds), including a precise definition of embedding a game in a larger game. Appendix B verifies that Nash equilibria satisfy this definition of embedding. Section 4 establishes further notation and states a key technical property proved in Appendix C. Section 5 states and proves the main theorem, Theorem 5.1. The proof is constructive in that each equilibrium in a stable set is shown to be induced by a quasi-perfect equilibrium in a solution of a particular metagame with perfect recall that embeds the given game. Section 6 interprets this result and provides concluding remarks.
Notation
This section provides sufficient notation for statements of the axioms in Section 3. Section 4 introduces additional notation for the theorems in Section 5 and Appendix C.
A typical game in extensive form is denoted Γ. Its specification includes a set N of players, a game tree with perfect recall for each player, and an assignment of players' payoffs at each terminal node of the tree. Let H n be player n's collection of information sets, and let A n (h) be his set of feasible actions at information set h ∈ H n . The specification of the tree can include a completely mixed strategy of Nature.
A player's pure strategy chooses an action at each of his information sets. Denote n's simplex of mixed strategies by Σ n and interpret its vertices as his set S n of pure strategies. The sets of profiles of players' pure and mixed strategies are S = n S n and Σ = n Σ n . The normal form of Γ assigns to each profile of players' pure strategies the profile of their expected payoffs; equivalently, it is the multilinear function G : Σ → R N that assigns to each profile of their mixed strategies the profile of their expected payoffs.
A player's behavioral strategy specifies a mixture over his actions at each of his information sets. Let B n be n's set of behavioral strategies, and B = n B n the set of profiles of players' behavioral strategies. Each mixed strategy σ n induces a behavioral strategy b n . Because the game has perfect recall, for each behavioral profile there are profiles of mixed strategies that induce it and yield the same distribution of outcomes (Kuhn [17] ).
As defined by Nash [22, 23] , an equilibrium is a profile of players' strategies such that each player's strategy is an optimal reply to other players' strategies. That is, if BR n (σ) ≡ arg max σ n ∈Σn G n (σ n , σ −n ) is player n's best-reply correspondence, then σ ∈ Σ is an equilibrium iff σ n ∈ BR n (σ) for every player n. The analogous definition of equilibrium in behavioral strategies is equivalent for games with perfect recall.
A refinement is a correspondence that assigns to each game a nonempty collection of nonempty connected closed subsets of its equilibria. Each selected subset is called a solution.
According to the above definitions, a mixed or behavioral strategy makes choices even at information sets that its previous choices exclude from being reached. In Section 4 we consider pure strategies to be equivalent if they make the same choices at information sets they do not exclude. And, we further simplify mixed and behavioral strategies by considering only their induced probability distributions on non-excluded terminal nodes. The definitions of an equilibrium and a refinement have equivalent statements in terms of these strategy spaces. Each equilibrium in a reduced strategy space corresponds to a set of equilibria as defined above, and analogously for solutions selected by a refinement. The axioms in Section 3 are stated in terms of mixed and behavioral strategies as defined above. One reason for this is that Axiom S implies invariance to redundant strategies, and thus justifies our later use of equivalence classes of strategies.
3. The Axioms 3.1. Undominated Strategies. The first axiom requires that no player uses a weakly dominated strategy. Say that a profile of players' strategies is undominated if each player's strategy is undominated.
Axiom A (Undominated Strategies): Each equilibrium in a solution is undominated.
3.2. Backward Induction. We interpret sequential equilibrium as the generalization to games with perfect recall of backward induction in games with perfect information, and to be consistent with Axiom A we insist on conditionally admissible optimal continuations from information sets. Here we obtain these properties from a quasi-perfect equilibrium, which requires a consistency property of beliefs that is stronger than required by Kreps 3.1 (Quasi-Perfect Equilibrium). A profile b ∈ B of behavioral strategies is a quasi-perfect equilibrium if it is the limit of a sequence of profiles of completely mixed behavioral strategies for which, for each player n, from each of his information sets, continuation of his strategy b n is an optimal reply to every profile in the sequence.
That is, if BR n (·|h) is n's best-reply correspondence in terms of behavioral strategies that continue from his information set h ∈ H n , and b n (h) is the continuation of his behavioral strategy b n from this information set, then the profile b ∈ B is quasi-perfect if
for some sequenceb
If the mixed-strategy profile σ ∈ Σ induces a behavioral profile b ∈ B that is a quasi-perfect equilibrium then we say that σ too is quasi-perfect. Similarly, the justifying sequenceb k can be represented by a sequenceσ
Van Damme shows that a quasi-perfect equilibrium induces a perfect equilibrium of the normal form, and a sequential equilibrium of the extensive form in which all players' beliefs are induced by the same justifying sequence. Moreover, by construction a quasi-perfect equilibrium provides for each player an admissible optimal continuation from each of his information sets. It can be shown that if payoffs are generic then every sequential equilibrium is quasi-perfect and extensive-form perfect.
The second axiom requires that some equilibrium in a solution is quasi-perfect.
Axiom B (Backward Induction): Each solution contains a quasi-perfect equilibrium.
If payoffs are generic then Axioms A and B imply that each solution lies in a component of undominated equilibria, each of which yields the same distribution over outcomes as a sequential equilibrium in the solution.
3.3. Small Worlds. The third axiom requires that a refinement is not affected by extraneous features of wider contexts in which a game is embedded, provided such contexts do not alter players' feasible strategies and payoffs. An embedding allows the presence of additional players whose actions might provide the original players with additional pure strategies equivalent to mixed strategies in the original game, and thus redundant. For simplicity, to define an embedding we use the normal form G : Σ → R N of the extensive-form game Γ. An embedding is described by a 'larger' gameG :
in which game G is 'embedded,' subject to certain restrictions specified below. The larger gameG has outsiders in a set o, in addition to insiders who are the players in N , and there can be additional moves by Nature. An insider n can have additional pure strategies inΣ n that are not pure strategies in S n but are equivalent to mixed strategies in Σ n . The basic requirement is that an embedding should preserve the game among insiders, conditional on actions by outsiders.
These restrictions have a technical formulation. There should exist a multilinear map f :Σ × Σ o → Σ that is surjective and such thatG n = G n • f for each insider n. Moreover, to exclude an embedding from introducing correlation among insiders' strategies, f should factor into separate multilinear maps (f n ) n∈N , where each component is a map
Admittedly, a statement of the axiom that uses this technical language could contain unsuspected implications. However, after stating the formal definition, we provide in Proposition 3.3 an equivalent formulation that is more detailed and more transparent, and that verifies the requisite properties. Also, Proposition 3.4 applies a precise test of whether the axiom is correctly stated, namely, a refinement that satisfies the axiom should be immune to the same embeddings that equilibria are.
Definition 3.2 (Embedding
and a collection of multilinear
Condition (a) ensures that embedding has no net effect on an insider's set of mixed strategies, conditional on outsiders' strategies, and condition (b) ensures that there is no net effect on any insider's payoffs.
Hereafter, ifG embeds G via maps f = (f n ) then we say that (G, f ) embeds G and thatG is a metagame for G. We omit description of f for metagames in extensive form that embed a game in extensive or strategic form. An elaborate example of a metagame in extensive form that embeds a game in extensive form is constructed in proving Theorem 5.1. Note that the property thatG is a metagame for G does not depend on specifying payoffs for the outsiders; in particular, it depends only on their extensive forms and the insiders' payoffs in the two games.
A multilinear map f n :Σ n × Σ o → Σ n is completely specified by its values at profiles of pure strategies. Letf n be the restriction of f n to the setS n × S o of profiles of pure strategies of player n and the outsiders in o. The following Proposition, proved in Appendix B, provides an alternative definition of embedding in terms of pure strategies. 
Property (2) assures that players' payoffs from pure strategies of G are preserved by the metagameG. Hence property (1) assures that each pure strategy s n ∈ S n is equivalent to some pure strategyt n = π −1 (s n ) ∈T n , independently of the outsiders' profile s o .
Pure strategies inS n \T n are redundant because payoffs from profiles in nT n exactly replicate payoffs from corresponding profiles in n S n for the embedded game G. In particular, iff n (s n , s o ) = σ n / ∈ S n then conditional on s o the pure strategys n is equivalent for insiders to the mixed strategy σ n ∈ Σ n .
The next Proposition, proved in Appendix B, verifies that equilibria are not affected by embedding in a metagame. A corollary of Proposition 3.4 is that embedding does not introduce correlation among insiders' strategies.
Using Definition 3.2 of embedding, the small worlds axiom is the following.
Axiom S (Small Worlds): If (G, f ) embeds G then the f -images of the solutions that a refinement selects forG are the solutions selected for G.
In view of Proposition 3.4, this axiom is an instance of the general principle that a refinement should inherit invariance properties of equilibria. Two special cases of Axiom S are the following.
Invariance: Suppose Σ o and o are singletons and insiders' payoffs and strategies inΣ differ from Σ only by treating some mixed strategies in Σ as additional pure strategies inS. Then Axiom S implies that solutions depend only on a game's reduced normal form obtained by deleting such redundant pure strategies.
Mertens' Small Worlds Axiom [21] : SupposeΣ = Σ. Then Axiom S implies that a solution does not depend on the presence of outsiders, i.e. solutions of the original game are the projections of the solutions of metagames obtained by adding dummy players.
3.4. Summary of the Axioms. We study refinements that are independent of embeddings in metagames that, for each profile of outsiders' strategies, preserve the strategies and payoffs of the game among insiders. And, we require that each of their solutions is a closed connected set of undominated equilibria, including one that is quasi-perfect. In particular, a solution of a metagame must contain a quasi-perfect equilibrium whose image is in the corresponding solution of the embedded game.
Additional Notation and Properties
In the sequel we consider only a game Γ in extensive form with perfect recall, two players, and generic payoffs. In this section we prepare for the statement and proof of the main theorem in Section 5.
4.1. Payoffs. Let Z be the set of terminal nodes of the game tree. Players' payoffs are given by a point u in U = R N ×Z , where u n (z) is the payoff to player n ∈ N at terminal node z ∈ Z. We assume that payoffs are generic in that there exists a lower dimensional subset U • of U such that our results are true for all games in U \ U • . The set U • includes the nongeneric set described in [4] . Therefore, each game outside U • has finitely many equilibrium outcome distributions, and in particular all equilibria in a component yield the same distribution over outcomes. However, the proofs in Section 5 and Appendix C require some genericity properties that are not necessarily implied by the construction in [4] . To avoid disrupting the main exposition, we defer to Appendix D the description of the exact set of genericity properties required for the proofs, and an explanation of why the resulting set U • of excluded payoffs has lower dimension.
4.2.
Notation for the Extensive Form. The set of players is N = {1, 2}, typically represented as a player n and the other player m = n. Let X be the set of nodes in the game tree. Let X n be the set of nodes where player n moves, partitioned into his information sets h ∈ H n . For a node x ∈ X n we write h(x) for the unique information set h ∈ H n that contains x. For each n and h ∈ H n , let A n (h) be the set of actions available to player n at h. Assume that actions at all information sets are labeled differently, and let A n be the set of all actions for player n.
Node x precedes another node y, written x ≺ y, if x is on the unique path from the root of the tree to y. For a node x ∈ X n and a ∈ A n (h(x)) write (x, a) ≺ y if x ≺ y and the path from the root of the tree to y requires player n to choose a at h(x). If (x, a) ≺ y and x and y belong to n's information sets h and h , respectively, then every node in h follows some node in h by the choice of a, so we write (h, a) ≺ h .
The set of pure strategies of player n is the set S n of functions s n : H n → A n such that s n (h) ∈ A n (h) for all h ∈ H n . For each n, s n ∈ S n and y ∈ X, let β n (y, s n ) be the probability that s n does not exclude y, i.e. β n (y, s n ) = 1 if for each (x, a) ≺ y with x ∈ X n , s n (h(x)) = a, and otherwise β n (y, s n ) = 0. By perfect recall, if y ∈ X n then β n (y , s n ) = β n (y, s n ) for all y ∈ h(y) and we write β n (h(y), s n ) for this probability. Likewise, for any node y we write β 0 (y) for the probability that Nature does not exclude y. Then for a profile s ∈ S the probability that node y is reached is β(y, s) ≡ β 0 (y)β 1 (y, s 1 )β 2 (y, s 2 ).
Recall that Σ n is the set of mixed strategies of player n. For each node y the function β n (y, ·) extends to a function over Σ n via β n (y,
Recall also that B n is the set of behavioral strategies of player n. For each b n ∈ B n , β n (y, b n ) is the product of b n 's probabilities of n's actions on the path to y.
Similarly extend β to profiles of mixed or behavioral strategies. Given a mixed-strategy profile σ ∈ Σ, the probability that outcome z results is β(z, σ)
by the formula ρ n (σ n ) = (β n (z, σ n )) z∈Z , and let ρ = (ρ n ) n∈N . Similarly, if b n ∈ B n is the behavioral strategy induced by σ n then ρ n (σ n ) = (β n (z, b n )) z∈Z . Let P n be the image of ρ n , and P = n P n the image of ρ. Then P n is a compact convex polyhedron, called the space of n's enabling strategies in [5] . Each vertex of P n corresponds to an equivalence class of n's pure strategies that exclude the same outcomes. 
Note that γ and G are multilinear functions. From players' best-reply correspondences in terms of enabling strategies one obtains the definition of equilibrium in enabling strategies. To each equilibrium in enabling strategies there correspond families of outcome-equivalent equilibria in behavioral and mixed strategies. Axioms A and S have direct analogs in terms of enabling strategies, as shown in [11] .
For games in extensive form with perfect recall, enabling strategies are minimal representations. For example, using perfect recall, by working backward in the induced tree of a player's information sets, from his enabling strategy one can construct the corresponding behavioral strategy at his information sets that his prior actions do not exclude. Because Axiom S implies Invariance, it is immaterial whether solutions are characterized in terms of mixed, behavioral, or enabling strategies. We use enabling strategies here because induced distributions over outcomes are multilinear functions of enabling strategies, like they are for mixed strategies but unlike the nonlinear dependence on behavioral strategies. Also, the dimensions of the spaces of enabling and behavioral strategies are the same, which is important for the technical property established in Theorem 4.1 below. Using these features, Section 5 derives the implications of the axioms in terms of enabling strategies. 5 In [5] , enabling strategies are defined in terms of terminal actions rather than terminal nodes. The present definition is equivalent because a player's probability of enabling a terminal action is the probability of enabling each terminal node that follows it. The vertices of P n are n's pure strategies in the 'pure reduced normal form' defined by Mailath, Samuelson, and Swinkels [18] . See Appendix A for illustrations.
4.4.
Stable Sets of Equilibria. Now letΣ * be a component of the equilibria of Γ in terms of mixed strategies, and letΣ * n be the projection ofΣ * in Σ n . By genericity, all equilibria inΣ * induce the same distribution over outcomes. Therefore, for each node x, β(x, σ) is the same for all σ ∈Σ * ; in particular, if x belongs to information set h ∈ H n and h is on an equilibrium path then β n (h, σ n ) is the same for every equilibrium strategy σ n of player n inΣ * . We therefore denote these probabilities by β * n (x) and β * n (h). Let H * n be the collection of information sets h ∈ H n of player n such that β * n (h) > 0 and let A * n be the set of actions at information sets in H * n that are chosen with positive probability by the equilibria inB * , whereB * is the set of profiles of behavioral strategies induced by equilibria inΣ * . Let S 0 n ⊂ S n be the set of pure strategies s is a singleton and its equivalent mixed strategy is stable. The only interesting case, therefore, is one where S 1 n is nonempty for at least one of the players. In order to avoid dealing with different cases, we assume that S 1 n is nonempty for each n. (Along the way, we will indicate how the proof changes when S 1 n is empty for exactly one player.)
n is the set of p n ∈ P n such that p n (z) = 0 for all z ∈ Z 1 n and thus P 0 n is a face of P n . However, the image P 
then for each n: 
Statement and Proof of the Theorem
We now state and prove the main theorem. We assume that a solution is represented in terms of enabling strategies, i.e. Q * ⊂ P is a solution iff it is the image under ρ of a solution Σ * ⊂ Σ. that is homeomorphic to a simplex, is contained in Q \ ∂Q and such that the projection onto the first factor is contained in the neighborhood U (q ) to P in a way that extends g ∂U (X * ) , we obtain a map g : Q → P such that all its points of coincidence with ψ, of which there is at least one, are contained in U (x * Hereafter, unless explicitly stated, we represent players' pure and mixed strategies in terms of the induced enabling strategies; thus, pure strategies in S n are represented as vertices of P n and mixed strategies are mixtures of these vertices.
5.2.
A Game with Redundant Strategies. We first construct a game with redundant pure strategies that is the basis for the metagame specified later. For each fixedp = (p 0 , p 1 ) ∈ P and δ ∈ (0, 1), consider the following game Γ(δ,p). Each player n chooses a strategy in the following manner (and unaware of his opponent's choices). Initially, player n provisionally chooses a pure strategy s 
• If he rejects all strategies in S In Γ(δ,p) the set of n's pure strategies isS n (δ, 
, where for each n and i, p . Then n's choice at this information set is equivalent to an enabling strategy in P n of the formq
is the mixture over strategies t n such that the strategy t 
The following lemma characterizes the important aspects of the outsiders' equilibrium strategies. . By passing to a subsequence, we can assume that there exist multisimplicesL of L and be a sequence of completely mixed behavioral strategies converging tob δ against which for each insider n and each information set of n inΓ δ , his continuation strategy is optimal. We now study the important features of both the sequence and its limit. If n chooses s n ∈ S 0 n in the first stage then in the second stage he has the option of revising this strategy to play something in T 0 n (δ). Therefore, quasi-perfection implies that player n will end up implementing s n with positive probability inb n inS n for each n as follows. For each s n ∈ S n , the probabilityσ
From player m's perspective it is the sequenceσ ε,δ n , or rather its equivalent sequence in P n , that matters for his choice. ) over his strategies inS n such that for each ε in a subsequence converging to zero,
converging to the origin. 
Quasi-perfection implies thatσ
By genericity of payoffs, Γ has finitely many equilibrium outcomes, so each of these equilibria induces the same equilibrium outcome-hence the claim follows. Three implications of this claim are: (i) l ) and a sequence (µ 0 (δ), . . . , µ k n −1 (δ)) ∈ R k n converging to zero such that for a subsequence of δ's, σ
is expressible as the nested combination
This LPS induces an equivalent LPS (q
) in enabling strategies.
Let k 1 n be the first level k of this LPS where q
does not belong to P 0 n . Recall from the previous section that q l 1 n ,δ n is expressible as a convex combination λ
does not belong to P 0 n . Going to a subsequence, let λ 1 n be the limit of (λ 
n . The next lemma sets out the key properties ofΛ δ n that lead to a conclusion of our proof. We turn now to (3). Every strategyq l,δ n for l < l 
Proof of
Lastly we prove (4) . By the previous paragraph, all strategies in P 
Final
Step of the Proof. Fix a small δ that satisfies the properties enumerated in Lemma 5.3 of the previous subsection. Let
Observe thatq n is empty for exactly one player n, as we said initially in the description of P and Q, we do not have the factor P 1 n or Π 1 n . In the family of games Γ(δ,p), player n decides provisionally in the first stage on the strategy in S n to play and in the second stage gets to execute it or switch to playing a strategy in T n (δ,p). In the metagame, we do not have outsiders o 1 n,j for j = 1, 2, 3. The rest of the analysis is essentially the same modulo these provisions.
Concluding Remarks
Like our previous paper [10] on forward induction, the characterization in this paper is a step toward a theory of equilibrium refinement using axioms adapted from decision theory. Theorem 5.1 is confined to games in extensive form with perfect recall, two players, and generic payoffs, but it suggests that an extension to more general games might be possible. We hope also that Axiom B can be weakened to require only that a solution contains a sequential equilibrium for which each player's strategy is conditionally admissible from each of his information sets-thus keeping the axioms entirely within standard decision theory.
Previously, some proposed refinements selected equilibria with one or more desirable properties, like admissibility, subgame perfection, or sequential rationality. Other proposed refinements derived some properties from limits of equilibria of perturbed games, such as perfect, quasi-perfect, and proper equilibria. In the latter approach, a key step forward was Kohlberg and Mertens' [14] argument that an axiomatic development requires set-valued refinements. Their program achieved remarkable success with Mertens' [19] definition of a stable set, which has the desirable properties 1, 2, 3 listed in Section 1 and others too, such as ordinality and immunity to splitting players into agents.
However, an axiomatic theory of refinement should be based on basic principles of rational behavior in the game at hand, as in decision theory. This precludes reliance on perturbed games obtained by perturbing players' sets of feasible strategies. The challenge, therefore, has been to establish why consideration of perturbed games yields the requisite decisiontheoretic properties.
Our answer here begins with Axiom S, which generalizes the invariance criterion of Kohlberg and Mertens' [14] and the small worlds criterion of Mertens' [21] , as explained in Section 3.3. Absent a strong invariance property like Axiom S, a refinement is vulnerable to 'framing effects' depending on wider contexts in which the given game might be embedded. In decision theory, such effects were examined by Savage [28] , and in cognitive psychology they play a prominent role in interpreting decisions by subjects in experiments, as for instance in Kahneman and Tversky [13] . For a theory of thoroughly rational behavior, however, an axiom should exclude framing effects. Axiom S does this by requiring a solution of a game to be consistent with the solution of any metagame in which it is embedded. As shown in Proposition 3.4, it is already true of any equilibrium that it is consistent with an equilibrium of any metagame in which the game is embedded. Axiom S merely extends to refinements this fundamental invariance property of equilibria.
Our answer continues with the proof of Theorem 4.1 in Appendix B. There it is shown that a set Q * of equilibria in enabling strategies is stable iff the corresponding projection map from the pseudomanifold Q to the space P of enabling strategies is essential. Using this key property, the proof of Theorem 5.1 shows that for each equilibrium in a component of undominated equilibria there exists a corresponding metagame for which the equilibrium is the image of a quasi-perfect equilibrium in the metagame if and only if the projection map is essential. Hence Axioms A, B, S imply that a solution is a stable set, and conversely due to Mertens' previous proofs.
The answer to the 'why' question above is thus that, given Axioms A and B, stability with respect to perturbed games is equivalent to an analogous 'stability' with respect to embeddings in metagames, as required by Axiom S. Because in practice every game is embedded in some wider context, we view Axiom S's requirement that a refinement is immune to presentation effects as the relevant criterion from the perspective of decision theory. This view is reinforced by the facts that Nash equilibria satisfy Axiom S, and that together with Axioms A and B, the implied refinement agrees with stability based on perturbed games.
For a refinement satisfying the axioms, Theorem 5.1 establishes that a solution of a game must be a component of its undominated equilibria, and that the component must be essential. Because payoffs are assumed to be generic, all equilibria in the component have the same paths of equilibrium play and thus the same distribution of outcomes. Therefore the main implication for equilibrium refinements is that a predicted outcome distribution should result from equilibria in an essential component of undominated equilibria, and in particular, from the sequential equilibria it necessarily contains.
A secondary implication is that after deviations from equilibrium play, the continuations of all equilibria in the component remain admissible and sequentially rational, where those that are not sequential equilibria of the original game are justified by beliefs induced by quasiperfect equilibria of corresponding metagames that embed the given game. This provides one resolution of the conundrum posed by Reny [25, 26, 27] . Figure 1 . A game tree and its pure reduced normal form in which each pure strategy is identified by the terminal nodes it does not exclude.
Appendix A. Enabling Strategies
In the normal-form representation of a game in extensive form, a player's pure strategy specifies the action chosen at each of his information sets in the game tree. However, outcomes are not affected by a strategy's actions at information sets excluded by his previous actions. One therefore considers equivalence classes of pure strategies. Say that two pure strategies are outcome equivalent if the sets of terminal nodes they do not exclude are the same. For instance, the game in Figure 1 is shown on the left side in extensive form and on the right side in the 'pure reduced normal form' (PRNF) introduced by Mailath, Samuelson, and Swinkels [18] . In the PRNF, each outcome-equivalent class of player 1's pure strategies is identified by the terminal nodes it does not exclude, as indicated by labels of rows along the left side; and each equivalence class of player 2's pure strategies is identified by the terminal nodes it does not exclude, as indicated by labels of columns along the top. Because this game has no moves by Nature, each row and column determine a unique outcome that is the intersection of the row and column labels, shown as the corresponding entry in the matrix.
A similar example is shown in Figure 2 for the game tree of a signaling game. In this case, each profile of pure strategies determines a pair of outcomes such that the first or second outcome occurs depending on whether Nature's initial move is up or down. For instance, the outcome of 1's strategy abcd and 2's strategy aceg is a with probability p and c with probability 1 − p.
Say that a terminal node that is not excluded is an enabled outcome. A pure strategy of a player enables outcome z if it chooses all his actions on the path to z. A player's mixed strategy randomizes over his pure strategies, whereas a behavioral strategy randomizes over Figure 2 . The game tree of a signaling game and its pure reduced normal form in which each pure strategy is identified by the terminal nodes it does not exclude.
actions at each of his information sets. A strategy of either kind induces a probability distribution over outcome-equivalent classes of his pure strategies, and thus a distribution over enabled outcomes. Such a distribution is called an enabling strategy.
is an enabling strategy for player n if it is the distribution over enabled outcomes induced by some mixed or behavioral strategy, i.e. p n (z) is the mixed strategy's probability of those pure strategies that enable outcome z. The vertices of the polyhedron P n of n's enabling strategies correspond to outcome-equivalent classes of n's pure strategies in the PRNF, as in Figures 1 and 2 . Enabling strategies are minimal representations of strategic behavior in games with perfect recall.
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Let p * (z) be the probability that Nature's strategy enables outcome z, which is 1 if Nature has no moves. Then for each profile p ∈ P = n P n of players' enabling strategies, the probability that outcome z results is γ z (p) = p * (z) n p n (z), because Nature and the players randomize independently. The extensive form is therefore summarized by the multilinear function γ : P → ∆(Z) ⊂ R Z that assigns to each profile of players' enabling strategies a distribution over terminal nodes, including the effect of Nature's enabling strategy. Player n's expected payoff is G n (p) = z γ z (p)u n (z). The game Γ is therefore summarized by the multilinear function G : P → R N that assigns to each profile of players' enabling strategies their expected payoffs. This summary specification is called the enabling form of the game.
Appendix B. Proofs of Propositions B.1. Proof of Proposition 3.3. A multilinear map f n :Σ n × Σ o → Σ n is completely specified by its values at profiles of pure strategies. We usef n to denote the restriction of f n to the setS n × S o of profiles of pure strategies. 
Proof. Suppose we have a gameG :Σ
and a collection of multilinear maps f n :Σ n × Σ o → Σ n , one for each n ∈ N , such that conditions (1) and (2) of the proposition are satisfied. Then, by condition (1) and multilinearity of f n for each n, for each fixed
is surjective because it maps the face spanned byT n homeomorphically onto Σ n . Also, condition (2) and multilinearity of each f n imply thatG = G • f . According to Definition 3.2, therefore, (G, f ) embeds G. Now suppose that (G, f ) embeds G. Let σ o be a profile of completely mixed strategies for outsiders. Because f n is multilinear it induces a linear mapping f n (·, σ o ) fromΣ n to Σ n that, by the definition of an embedding, is surjective. Hence, for each s n ∈ S n there exists a pure strategyt n (s n ) inS n that is mapped to s n by this linear map. We claim that f n (t n (s n ),
, which is an average of values at vertices of S o , cannot be s n . Thus, f n (t n (s n ), s o ) = s n for all s o . LetT n ⊂S n be a collection comprising a different pure strategyt n (s n ) for each s n ∈ S n and let π n be the associated bijection. Definê (1) and (2) Proof. Suppose (σ, σ o ) is an equilibrium ofG and let σ = f (σ, σ o ). For any insider n and his strategy τ n ∈ Σ n there existsτ n ∈Σ n such that f n (τ n , σ o ) = τ n because f n (·, σ o ) is surjective by condition (a) of Definition 3.2 an embedding. Using condition (b),
where the inequality obtains because (σ, σ o ) is an equilibrium ofG. Hence σ is an equilibrium of G.
Conversely, suppose σ is an equilibrium of G. For each n, let π n be the bijection given by Proposition 3.3. Letσ n be the strategy for insider n inG defined byσ n (t n ) = σ n (π n (t n )) for t n ∈T n andσ n (s n ) = 0 fors n / ∈T n . Since f n is multilinear, by condition (1) of Proposition 3.3, f n (σ n , ·) = σ n and thus f (σ, ·) = σ. Hence, it suffices to show that there exists a strategy profile σ o for outsiders such that (σ, σ o ) is an equilibrium ofG. By fixing the profile of insiders' strategies to beσ one induces a game among outsiders. Let σ o be an equilibrium of this induced game among outsiders. To see that (σ, σ o ) is an equilibrium ofG, observe that for each pure strategys n of an insider n:
where the first and second equalities use the property f (σ, ·) = σ established above, and the inequality obtains because σ is an equilibrium of G.
Appendix C. Proof of Theorem 4.1
Theorem C.1. (Q, ∂Q) is a pseudomanifold of the same dimension as (P, ∂P). Moreover, ψ : (Q, ∂Q) → (P, ∂P) is an essential map iff Q * is stable.
Proof. The proof invokes genericity of payoffs by assuming that certain points and polyhedra, identified as they arise during the proof, are in general position. See Appendix D for elaboration of the character of these genericity requirements.
For any set X, we write d(X) for its dimension. For any subset T n of S n , let P n (T n ) be the convex hull (in P n ) of the strategies in T n . For simplicity, we write d(T n ) for d(P n (T n )). See Sections 4.4 and 4.5 for additional notation used below.
For any vertex π Proof. Since P n (T 0 n ) is a face of P 0 n , which is itself a face of P n , there exists a linear function f : R Z → R that is zero on P n (T 0 n ) and negative everywhere else on P n . Fix p m in the interior of P m and define a payoff functionũ n for n by the equation: p 0 (z)p m (z)ũ n (z) = f (e z ) where e z is the z-th unit vector in R Z . Then when n's payoff function isũ n , the strategies in P n (T 0 n ) are the best replies against p m . Take t n / ∈ T 0 n . Since it is suboptimal against p m , there exists an information set h n where the action a chosen by t n is suboptimal. Then h n does not belong to H * n : indeed, since t n belongs to S 0 n , a is an equilibrium action if h n ∈ H * n ; and since P n (T 0 n ) contains an equilibrium strategy, there exists a strategy in T 0 n that enables such an h n and chooses a. Let h n be the last information set preceding h n that belongs to H * n . Then obviously the action chosen by t n at h n is an equilibrium action and thus h n belongs to H 0 n . Any strategy in T 0 n that enables h n avoids a, which proves the lemma.
For the next lemma, it is worth recapitulating the exact definition of the set Π 1 n . Recall from Section 4.5 that we fix a completely mixed enabling strategyp m for player m and compute for each p n the total probability η(p n ) of reaching a terminal node in Z 
n iff there exists a unique information set h n ∈ H * n with the property that s n enables h n and chooses a non-equilibrium action there.
Proof. Let s n ∈ S
1 n be a pure strategy satisfying the condition of the lemma. We prove by contradiction thatπ 1 n (s n ) is a vertex of Π 1 n . Therefore suppose to the contrary thatπ 
n cannot choose a non-equilibrium action at any h n = h n in H * n that it enables; since it belongs to S 1,j n it must therefore enable h n ; and it cannot choose a different non-equilibrium action from s n at h n . Observe now that the probability η(p n ) and η(s 1,j n ) for all j are equal and exactly the probability that Nature and the strategȳ p m do not exclude h n . Therefore,
n to a strategy t 1,j n so that at every information set other than the successors to h n , t 1,j n agrees with s n , and at the successors to h n it agrees with s 1,j n . It is now clear that when viewed as enabling strategies, s n = j λ j t 1,j n and thus s n is a convex combination of the strategies t 1,j n . But that is a contradiction since s n is a vertex of P n and all the strategies t 1,j n are different from one another and from s n as they induce the points π 1,j n that are different from one another and fromπ
To prove the other way around, suppose s n is a strategy that, at a collection h k n for k = 1, . . . , K of at least two information sets in H * n , chooses a non-equilibrium action. For each k, choose a strategy s
n that enables h k n , agrees with s n there and at all its successors, but at other h n ∈ H * n , chooses an equilibrium action. Then 
The following lemma provides an important feature of the set T n .
Lemma C.5. The strategies in T n are the vertices of a face of P n whose dimension is
Proof. LetT 1 n be the set of strategies t
such that for each k, t contains P n (T n ) and that the dimension of P n (T n ) is as stated. To finish the proof of the lemma, we show that P n (T n ) is a face of P n . Let Q n be the smallest face of P n that contains P n (T n ). Suppose Q n = P n (T n ). Then there exists a point p n in the relative of interior of P n (T n ) and Q n . Therefore p n can be expressed as a convex combination of the vertices of 
where the continuation strategy of t 2,k n coincides with that of some t n ∈ S 0 n \ T 0 n but not for any s n ∈ T 0 n . As in the previous case, this too is impossible.
One corollary of the above result obtains when we take T 1 n to be S 1 n and Ψ
n is a face of P n and otherwise it equals the dimension of
2 )), where for each n, P n (T n )∩Q * n nonempty and Ψ Proof. Since Q * n ∩P n (T n ) is nonempty, the strategies in T 0 n are undominated. Hence, 
Proof. LetP Let C * n (T ) be the closure of the set of q n in the interior of P n such that the strategies in T m are all equally good replies and at least as good as strategies inT 
On each maximal proper face C of C n (T ), exactly one of the following holds for all (p Proof. We show that C n (T ) is a polyhedron of the stated dimension. Since the construction is similar to that in the previous lemma, the enumerated properties can be proved just as before. Let P 2 n be the convex hull of P 0 n and P n (T 1 n ). Using Lemma C.5, the dimension of P
n andP n be the convex cones spanned by P 2 n and P n , respectively.
) and is thus a polyhedron. As will be shown in the course of the proof of the next lemma, C * Let T be the collection of T 's such that A n (T ), B n (T ) and C n (T ) are nonempty for each n. . To show that it is a best reply it is sufficient to show that an information set h n that is enabled by s n is enabled by some vertex of either Q 0 n or Q 1 n and that this vertex agrees with s n 's choice a n there. Suppose that this h n is in H * n and a n ∈ A * n , or h n belongs to H 0 n ; then obviously some strategy in Q 0 n or Q 1 n enables h n and chooses a n , by the definition of T 0 n . If h n ∈ H * n and a n / ∈ A * n or h n follows some information set in H * n by the choice of a non-equilibrium action, then some strategy in Q 1 n enables it and chooses this action, since otherwise s n enables a terminal node that is excluded by all strategies in Q (3) given T, R ∈ T , there exists a finite chain
) is a subset of a maximal proper face of each and has a nonempty interior in this face.
Fix
. We start with (1) . Suppose now that x belongs to the interior of Q(R) for some R. We show that R = T . Since x belongs to the interior of Q(T ), we can assume that every strategy in S 
Since the strategies inŘ 1 m are inferior replies to points in the interior of A n (T ), B * n (R) if nonempty has dimension d * n (T ) − 1. Therefore, if B n (R) = B n (R ), their intersection with B n (T ) has codimension 1 in B n (T ) and x cannot belong to two of these sets at once. On the other hand, if B n (R) = B n (R ) then an argument similar to that in the previous paragraph shows that generic (p 1 n , π 1 n ) ∈ C n (T ) can belong to at most one of these sets, C n (R) and C n (R ). Hence a generic x belongs to at most one of these sets. Likewise, for R of the form ((R
, the intersection of B n (T ) with B n (R) and B n (R ) has codimension at least one. Thus x belongs to at most one set Q(R). To finish the proof of this part, we show that it belongs to at least one such set. Letř , p) where the strategy set is P but where the payoff from an enabling strategy profile q is the payoff in G from the profile (1 − ε)q + εp. If q is an equilibrium of G(ε, p), we say that (1 − ε)q + εp is a perturbed equilibrium of G(ε, p). Let E be the closure of the set of (ε, p, q) such that (ε, p) ∈ Y 1 \ ∂Y 1 and q is a perturbed equilibrium of G(ε, p). Let θ be the projection map from E. For each subset E of E and each 0 < ε, let (E ε , ∂E ε ) be E ∩ θ −1 (P ε , ∂P ε ). In [9] we show that there exists 0 <ε 1 and a finite number of subsets E In [6] we show that there exists a neighborhood of Σ * and an ε > 0 such that the set of ε-perfect equilibria in this neighborhood is connected. The image of this set of ε-perfect equilibria under ρ is therefore connected. Thus there exists some k such that E k 0 = { 0 }×Q * . Q * is stable iff the projection θ from E k to Yε is essential (Mertens [19] ). For simplicity in notation we refer to this E k as simply E. It is now sufficient to prove that ψ is essential iff the projection θ from E is essential. For each n,P n ≡ [0, 1] × P n and define χ n :P n → P n by χ n (λ n , p 0 n , p
Then we have that ((P n , ∂P n ), (P n , ∂P n ), χ n ) is a ball-bundle. Let χ be the product map In case S 1 n is empty, the construction is modified as follows. We can omit the sets C n (T ) and B m (T ) from the description of Q(T ). In the last lemma above, the vector λ is now just a number, one for player m. The simplex D constructed there is 2-dimensional and contains a curve L of the form λ = ε r . The rest of the proof is essentially the same. This concludes the proof of the Theorem.
Appendix D. The Genericity Assumption
The conclusions of this paper necessarily hold only when, fixing the game tree, the payoffs lie in a generic set. Here we outline the nature of the genericity that is invoked. First, we require that the game have finitely equilibrium outcomes: in [4] we show that outside a lower-dimensional set every game has finitely many outcomes. Second, the constructions in Appendix C rely on certain polyhedra being in general position. Each of these polyhedrathere are finitely many of them-is a set of enabling strategies for a player n against which, in a certain class of strategies for player m, a subclass is optimal. Since these are defined by linear equations and inequalities in the payoffs of player m, the set of games where the arguments fail is a lower-dimensional set. Third, Lemma C.11 requires a characterization of stable sets that in [9] we show holds for all games outside a lower-dimensional set.
